gulf of tonkin conspiracy

AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . The report covers all aspects of the efforts of the various American SIGINT agencies from the early postWorld War II years through the evacuation of Saigon. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. 11. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. WebThe Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of Representatives passed it unanimously. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. In 2005 documents were released proving that Johnson had fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in order to justify attacking North Vietnam. At the White House, administration officials panicked as the public spotlight illuminated their policy in Vietnam and threatened to reveal its covert roots. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. Oklahoma City Bombing. The United States Military had three SIGINT stations in the Philippines, one for each of the services, but their combined coverage was less than half of all potential North Vietnamese communications. . To increase the chances of success, SOG proposed increased raids along the coast, emphasizing offshore bombardment by the boats rather than inserting commandos. Gulf of Tonkin - A secret report reveals how easily soldiers, spies and politicians can jump to a conclusion and plunge the country into war. A U.S. Navy SEAL (Sea Air Land) team officer assigned to the SOG maritime operations training staff, Lieutenant James Hawes, led the covert boat fleet out of Da Nang and down the coast 300 miles to Cam Ranh Bay, where they waited out the crisis in isolation. In 1964 the Navy was attempting to determine the extent of North Vietnams maritime infiltration into the South and to identify the Norths coastal defenses so that Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) could better support South Vietnams commando operations against the North. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident - ThoughtCo Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. On 6 August, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox was ". Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. The Maddox was attacked at 1600. On 28 July, the latest specially fitted destroyer, the Maddox (DD-731), set out from Taiwan for the South China Sea. One of the great ironies of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for President Johnson is that it was for him, politically, a great success, he continues. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. 5. In the days leading up to the first incident of August 2nd, those secret operations had intensified.. 8. I would not suggest that he learned from the Gulf of Tonkin incident so much as that he got from it exactly what he wanted, which was an enormous bump in approval ratings 30 percent overnight, says historian Chris Oppe. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. . Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." 8. The Pentagon had already released details of the attack, and administration officials had already promised strong action. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. On 3 August, the CIA confirmed that "Hanois naval units have displayed increasing sensitivity to U.S. and South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin during the past several months. Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression . The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately 1430 hours Vietnam time on August 2, 1964, USS Maddox (DD-731) detected three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching at high speed. Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. Gradually, the Navy broadened its role from supply/logistics to aid/advisory -- training Vietnamese and developing the South Vietnamese navy's famed "brown water force," those riverine units operating in the country's matrix of rivers and canals and through the coastal network of islands and archipelagos. (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. The entirety of the original intercepts, however, were not examined and reanalyzed until after the war. With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. Signals Intelligence is a valuable source but it is not perfect. While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. Nigerians await election results in competitive race. Launching on Aug. 5, Operation Pierce Arrow saw aircraft from USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation strike oil facilities at Vinh and attack approximately 30 North Vietnamese vessels. As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. Suffice to say here that the version as presented here by Marolda and Fitzgerald is highly credible and completely plausible, and I for one am persuaded of its correctness. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. 2, pp. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. Gulf of Tonkin Conspiracy Theory As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. "1 Most of these would be shore bombardment. Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after 1400 hours EDT. The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. Given the maritime nature of the commando raids, which were launched from Da Nang, the bulk of the intelligence collecting fell to the Navy. Listen to McNamara's conversation with Johnson. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 18. Hickman, Kennedy. Because the North Vietnamese had fewer than 50 Swatows, most of them up north near the important industrial port of Haiphong, the movement south of one-third of its fleet was strong evidence that 34A and the Desoto patrols were concerning Hanoi. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) | National Archives During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. Hanoi denied the charge that it had fired on the U.S. destroyers on 4 August, calling the charge "an impudent fabrication. Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. That very night, the idea was put to the test. Thousands of passengers are stranded after Colombias Viva Air grounds flights, The last of Mexicos artisanal salt-makers preserve a 2,000-year-old tradition, I cannot give up: Cambodian rapper says he will sing about injustice despite threats from govt, Ukrainian rock star reflects on a year of war in his country, Ukrainian refugees in Poland will now be charged to stay in state-funded housing, This Colombian town is dimming its lights to attract more tourists to view the night sky, Kneel and apologize!: 76 years after island-wide massacre, Taiwan continues to commemorate and debate the tragedy. The original radar contacts dropped off the scope at 2134, but the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. Vaccines. PTF-1 and PTF-2 were U.S.-built 1950s vintage boats pulled out of mothballs and sent to Vietnam. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility. A distinction is made in these pages between the Aug. 2 "naval engagement" and the somewhat more ambiguous Aug. 4 "naval action," although Marolda and Fitzgerald make it clear they accept that the Aug. 4 action left one and possibly two North Vietnamese torpedo-firing boats sunk or dead in the water. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. Haiphong again repeated the recall order after the attack. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. McNamara insisted that the evidence clearly indicated there was an attack on August 4, and he continued to maintain so in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons From Vietnam. Aircraft from the Ticonderoga (CVA-14) appeared on the scene, strafing three torpedo boats and sinking the one that had been damaged in the battle with the Maddox. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. The Gulf of Tonkin incident - Vietnam War What really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964? Cookies collect information about your preferences and your devices and are used to make the site work as you expect it to, to understand how you interact with the site, and to show advertisements that are targeted to your interests. This time, however, President Johnson reacted much more skeptically and ultimately decided to take no retaliatory action. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. The Science of Conspiracy Theories - Gulf of Tonkin conspiracy Unfortunately, much of the media reporting combined or confused the events of August 2 and 4 into a single incident. Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots.

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